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Essay 
 
What threats may cyber warfare implicate on 
Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV)? Are those 










This essay will investigate the cyber threats presented on 
UAVs, which are now the backbone of the US arsenal on 
the war on terror. In addition, it will assess whether the US 
government are taking serious measures to counter the 
threat that cyber warfare could implicate on their drone 
fleets. Finally, would suggest some policies prescription to 
combat that threat. 
 
 
From the mountainous terrains of Afghanistan to the 
hustle and bustle in the streets of Baghdad, UAVs 
industry is greatly increasing due to their success and 
reliability demonstrated by the US and Israeli air 
forces. UAVs would deliver the precision strikes that 
one would require with minimum to no casualties on 
the attackers position, and if the UAV is down, no 
pilots are downed with it. Those are all reasonable 
factors that influence a governments decision into 
having a drone fleets at their disposal. But one tends 
to forget an important thing, is that because those 
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UAV are designed to be unmanned thus it is linked 
to the pilot, who is in a completely different place, by 
a software or in other words by cyber means. This 
simple fact as good and safe as it sounds that the 
pilot will be unharmed in course of a battle, is 
vulnerability, that now non-state actor, and states, 
and suspiciously state-sponsored “hackers” are 
taking advantage of. What we are now witnessing is 
the new age of asymmetric warfare; it is cyber 
warfare in its front lines. The main question that this 
essay addresses, are the politicians, manufacturers, 
and government tacking this new warfare, and threat 
on the UAVs, which could just be a start as a breach 
in the drone technology might be a wakeup call that 
the military establishment and infrastructure could be 
penetrated by cyber means, seriously enough? Are 
there being measures taken by the US government, in 
particular because they have the largest drone fleet 
that is deployed across the globe, more enemies 
which makes them more prone to attacks, to combat 
these new phenomena? This essay will investigate 
this issue, by comparing measures taken by other 
drone manufacturing states, for securing those drones 
by cyber means, and by looking at new technical 
innovations that could then help in making a policy 
prescription to secure the drones. 
 
Back in the day cyber “attacks” were conducted 
though signals interception, radio transmission 
extraction or manipulation, today drones are ran by 
what seems to be a sophisticated method of delivery 
software system is not even the case these days in 
which this essay will demonstrate how these UAV 
are very vulnerable to cyber attacks. These cyber 
attacks are not specific meaning that it doesn’t aim 
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for destruction necessarily, but the evidence will 
show that the UAVs could be easily penetrated, by a 
virus or by a capable hacker who could acquire the 
UAV and transform its allegiance. Although there is 
no evidence which would support that a UAV has 
been infected by a virus or penetrated by a hacker 
and started killing it’s owner like what we expect in 
our popular culture a “SkyNet” change of awareness 
issue or a machine revolution were we see the drones 
in the Terminator movies turn against the humans 
and starts killing them. This may not be the case 
today, but with the evidence at hand, and innovation, 
technology and very good cyber awareness, proper 
funding with a sense of purpose, whether guided or 
misguided, the sky is the only limit when coming to 
cyber activity versus modern day drones. It’s very 
easy to use this asymmetric means of warfare and is 
less risky that the good old-fashioned guerilla 
warfare in which has to mobilize a large group of 
people who in most, if not all cases, have a state 
actor constantly supplying them whether with stinger 
missiles, AK-47s, Chinese Red Eagle anti-tank, 
Konkurs, it has a lot of hassle and involves a lot of 
countries, which in turn increase polarization. 
However, in the age of “cyber revolution” or the 
information age, we see many non-state actors are 
starting to adopt these new ways as an asymmetric 
means of warfare, as they are concealable, cheap a 
good cyber attack may vary its cost from 300$ to 
50000$ maximum only, and with capable trained 
hands could be fatal to the victims key infrastructure. 
Though, this essay is only focusing on the attacks 
aimed at the military infrastructure, in specific 
drones and UAVs, because as it became obvious, its 
easier to destroy the drones cyber activity rather or 
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disabling their software is far more accurate and 
devastating than aiming and shooting a stinger 
missile at that drone. Which in this case, tactically 
speaking, since one could assume that the drone is 
transmitting back to base what it sees, could cause a 
retaliation of another drone in the same area. What 
we’re seeing now is not just attacks on drones for the 
purposes of defense, in some cases drones when 
hacked and brought down are more valuable that a 
destroyed drone.  
 
What we see here is the dawn of the cyber age, 
during the cold war, guerilla warfare strategy was 
considered the poor man’s tactic of resisting the 
enemy and fighting the adversary, but now cyber 
warfare, in this case could be used by states less 
developed military to counter the US military 
hegemony based on attack their vulnerabilities, the 
problem is are the US taking serious measures? Are 
the other drone operating states also taking serious 
measures, because drones are heavily relied upon for 
security and field operations but are also very 
vulnerable what if the non-state actors or terrorist 
groups gain access to such cyber capabilities, 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda are realizing 
this and taking advantage of this “breakthrough” and 
using it for themselves. This could reshape the 
battlefield tactics that are taking place on the ground, 
reducing the US tactical advantage that gave its boots 
on the ground the edge it has over the insurgents in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
The most popular example that made the UAV 
vulnerabilities surface was when the Iranians capture 
Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 Sentinel UAV on 
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December 4th 2011, by Iranian cyber warfare unit 
(Mick, 2009). The RQ-170 UAV and other military 
UAVs have the GPS as a backbone or core of their 
guidance system, in addition of an inertial navigation 
system (INS). According to INFOSEC Institute, the 
UAV was downed by a GPS “spoofing attack” which 
is basically sending to the drone’s control system a 
fake coordinates which deceives the on board system 
which then makes it go to a place it is newly 
commanded. Spoofing is basically making the drone 
think it’s going to its programmed designation while 
in fact the coordinates provided make it in reality go 
somewhere else (Mick, 2009). Drones get their 
orders from their local base, but are flown from 
another base through satellite transmission. Spoofing 
just intercepts this whole process and goes straight to 
the drone. Even though, this particular drone and 
military drones uses INS because it’s known to have 
a healthy amount of errors and inaccuracies they 
have to have a GPS system and an air data computer 
to maintain the required navigation performance 
(Mick, 2009). This is how drones that have the GPS 
guidance system as a core is threatened, all they did 
was a radar jammer and deception system, and it’s 
not that hard to accomplish according to University 
of Texas at Austin students even without the radar 
jamming and deception systems. 
 
At Austin Texas, assistant professor Todd Humphrey 
along with some other 5 students have demonstrated 
how the UAV whether civilian or military (they 
proved their point on civilian drone though) is very 
vulnerable. Todd had demonstrated such in front of 
the Department of Homeland Security, that the 
process isn’t complicated as the Iranians claim it is, 
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to show that they have a strong cyber warfare unit, 
but with a group of well aware students and not more 
than a thousand dollars could implicate around four 
million dollar damage, which is the price of one 
predator drone (Reuters, 2009). This only shows that 
drones do not have some proper cyber security 
mechanisms, and the drones in mid air are probably 
compromised. This was easy to conduct because the 
drones use an unencrypted GPS system and 
apparently with these two incidents it is not enough 
to convince DHS and DoD to commit or make a 
change or at least cut-back from the UAV use, since 
it is highly unlikely that they will change the GPS 
from the encrypted to unencrypted one. Imagine that 
non-state actors will shift all their efforts into cyber 
“air defense” to counter the UAVs attacking them. 
These are just simple starters of a more damaging 
storm coming further, let’s say if those guys were 
either funded or well educated, for instance the 
Texas students we could give them the fact that they 
are US residents if not citizens so they are aware of 
the UAV systems used in the US and could therefore 
know how to access it and familiarize themselves to 
it, then later hack it.  
 
On parallel incidents Wall Street Journal reported on 
rumors that Hezbollah might have also captured an 
Israeli drone using the same spoofing techniques. 
This is the probable explanation because there was 
not reports of anti-air fire, gun fire nor anything, that 
is according to the UN peacekeeping force in 
Lebanon reports, which speculates that Hezbollah 
may have found a cyber way to penetrate the drones, 
both sides had no comments (Reed, 2011) about this 
incident and was rapidly forgotten, however 
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according to an anonymous Israeli source with IDF 
and military intelligence experience, the Israeli may 
have purposefully crashed the UAV into Lebanon so 
that Hezbollah wouldn’t get this cyber victory. This 
could either suggest that Iran may have sold the 
technological cyber innovation applied on the RQ-
170 incident and possibly handing it over to the none 
state-actor which in this case could be used in the 
future as means to increase their popularity as 
“guardians of the sky” and regain more influence on 
Lebanese internal politics, and with their 
involvement in Syria, this might increase their 
regional influence as well. The fact that this 
suggestion, Israel deliberately crashing the UAV, 
shows that the Israelis are aware that there is an 
imminent cyber threat facing their drones, which is 
not only a core in their air force, but also is the 
flagship of the Israeli military industry is at stake.  
 
It could be possible that this will be how future proxy 
wars will take place between the Chinese, American, 
and possibly Russians and Pakistanis, who also 
shown an increase in cyber activity (Bak, 2013), as it 
is a cheap and effective means to destroy and steal 
“intellectual property” of UAVs, it is popular that 
that’s how the Chinese have built the Chengdu J-20 
stealth fighter from the downed F-117 Nighthawk the 
only one shot down (Jennings, 2011). Would the 
Chinese known for their infamous cyber warfare unit 
be a part of these series of cyber attacks against 
specifically US UAV? It could be given that the 
Chinese are developing their own drone program it is 
a safe probability that they may have even aided the 
Iranians who would aid Hezbollah on the other had 
in return for the Chinese to get access over the 
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“downed” drones, as its cheaper to imitate a 
technology rather that start a new one from scratch. 
With Chinese economies of scale they could flood 
the drone market with their cheap UAVs and would 
also flood in this case the non-state actors, the anti-
drones market.  
 
To further emphasize how the UAVs are threatened 
by cyber attacks, Iraqi insurgents with what it may 
appear as a $26 dollars (MacAskill, 2009) have 
managed to tap into the video feeds of the drones 
making the insurgents have an intelligence advantage 
(BBC, 2009). This shows that there is a risk 
involving further investment on UAVs and 
continuous dependence on them.  
 
A few days ago the US navy celebrated the launch of 
a bomber drone from an aircraft carrier, the 
mechanism of bombing is very simple, it has the 
same GPS coordinates stored in its software where it 
goes to bomb, then get back and lands in the aircraft 
carrier. This shows that GPS spoofing threats and 
drones being hacked aren’t being taken seriously by 
the defense manufacturers, two years ago Iranians, 
Hezbollah, and insurgents managed to hack “recon” 
UAVs but with the advancement UAVs capabilities 
one must assume that there is also an advance in 
cyber weapons. Unfortunately, as we see with new 
drones being manufactured from the US haven’t seen 
much change in policy, it has the same GPS system 
as core, which was shown to be compromised by the 
Iranians, non-state actors and even students, but 
ironically, they made new bombers completely 
automatic with that same core, wouldn’t one fear that 
if this is hacked or spoofed it might bomb civilian 
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targets? Or should this happen in order to grab the 
Department of Defense, and State attention? 
 
With increasing dependencies on drones and 
robotics, the risk gets higher, previous incidents were 
proven limited to hacking for the purpose of 
acquisition of technology and intelligence gathering. 
However, we know that with the increase realization 
that cyber weapons were proved effective as 
asymmetric means of warfare, why would terrorist 
and none-state actors limit themselves into hacking 
into video feeds? There is no limit when it comes to 
ideas on what to do with another country’s weapons 
so they’d get the blame, especially when it comes to 
civilian casualties. The US defense department must 
beware of the consequences and risks when coming 
behind future reliance on drones, because it wouldn’t 
just be limited on leak of US technologies, but on 
innocent civilian lives, and when this happen there 
will be a larger uproar from the people in victimized 
countries.  
 
On a military defensive level, countries reliance on 
drones may seem more cost effective, as they fly for 
much longer, don’t require the same expenses of 
pilot training as pilots do. However, all that said too 
much reliance on a “drone fleet” may and will put a 
country in jeopardy, as James Pavitt said, “it’s not a 
matter of if, it’s a matter of when”. The US defense 
department are putting too much then they should on 
an offensive weapon with no defense to it, while the 
Chinese, rogue agents, terrorists, and none state 
actors are investing on the counter-offensive, which 
is cyber offensive on those drones. On October 11th 
2011, a US drone base was hacked and a virus was 
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planted to the drones cockpits in Nevada, the heart of 
the States, and wasn’t reported (Shachtman, 2011). 
That virus is a “key logging” virus, which enables 
hackers to monitor the drones operations. The virus 
is yet unknown whether is continued contaminating 
the rest of the UAVs or no (Al Jazeera, 2011). This 
shows for one that the drones are very vulnerable to 
viruses too, meaning that they could get a virus and 
be grounded from flight, two it also shows that there 
aren’t measures for cyber security regarding drones. 
What we’re witnessing right now is the “when” 
happening maybe not on a Pearl Harbor scale but it is 
already happening, and each and every time it gets 
even more damaging, but also underrated attention. 
The reason behind these embarrassments or breaches 
being announced is plenty, but probably it may be 
due to the powerful influence of the military 
industrial complex over the department of defense. 
One must look at it from a CEO’s perspective for a 
minute, a cost/profit analysis of this issue. The 
reluctance for cyber securing the drones might be 
because it will cost too much as opposed the profit it 
will make, so they just ignore it. Maybe, a project is 
underway however, it is classified so we wouldn’t 
know it will only manifest by the number of future 
breaches we’ll have to count, if there more then it’s 
safe to assume that there is nothing being done about 
it. If not, then it is being taken seriously.  
 
As of now, all we know is that this issue has caught 
congress’s attention (Sperry, 2012), and is under 
debate. However, as this essay discovered, there 
seems to be a “drone lobbying” group, which 
basically undermines those threats, saying that the 
average person cannot hack nor plant a virus on the 
10





drones. Should governments wait till the “average” 
person hack those drones (Pruvis, 2012) to take 
action? Or should we assume that one day the 
average “adversary” is an average person who cannot 
hack a drone? That argument of theirs is redundant it 
simply shows that they’re only concerned on their 
sales, not security. It is very ironic that the lobby 
even makes such statements; even if they’re true the 
enemy is recruiting experts in this cyber business and 
the insurgents if they are not trained they will get the 
training they’ll need to become the “above average” 
in order to grab those lobbyists’ attention. However, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seems 
disinterested, as it failed to attend the hearing in July 
2012, in addition to its unwillingness to accept the 
task of regulating the drones with the Federal 
Aviation Administration. Bearing in mind, that 
currently domestic forces such as DHS, and police 
forces use unencrypted GPS system which is at risk, 
because the “unencrypted” one that the US military 
claims to use, Iranians don’t attest to that, is also 
compromised, the Iranians took over the RQ-170. 
For the reason that using “unencrypted” GPS system 
for domestic use would cost too much, can DHS, 
which its sole purpose is to secure the homeland is 
reluctant to pay such cost, does that mean that their 
willing to risk people’s lives because of greed or is 
the cost of life, privacy, and the way of life now has 
a price tag to it? Isn’t that contradicting their primary 
objective? But that seems like the military industrial 
complex is speaking from the cost/profit point of 
view, because as long as DHS is concerned cost 
should bother them as long as it will make their life 
easier. So that third party may be influencing the 
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DHS into not taking serious measures regarding 
drone cyber security.  
 
There are several measures to combat this threat 
facing the drones that drone operating governments, 
if they aren’t willing to cut-back, could do to avoid 
future setbacks. For instance, instead of using 
unencrypted GPS system that could be spoofed 
easily by a bunch of Texas students, or by the sky 
scanner application or cheap software that could be 
downloaded from the internet is one, they could use 
encrypted ones, the same way the Chinese do it. That 
way it will at least secure domestic drones, from 
hacking as it is harder to bring a radar jammer inland 
without being noticed is something. 
 
There should be a formal cyber security division to 
protect against hackers, and cyber attacks, such as 
viruses. The same way the Chinese are appearing to 
have a cyber unit why not all governments especially 
the US (since it’s the one being under constant 
attack) have one on its own? At least as defensive 
means, for the drones there is a cyber unit that its 
main goal isn’t just limited to prevention of hacking, 
but protection of the intelligence is has, because 
when speaking domestically, drones may be used as 
means to breach civilian privacy also.  Or reshaping, 
reinforcing the DoD’s Host Based Security System 
to meet contemporary standards, in order to include 
UAVs among the “threatened” units that should be 
protected. 
 
Apparently, the defense advanced research projects 
agency (Darpa) is currently looking for different 
measures for protecting the drones. One of them is 
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by simply hiring other hackers to advice on what to 
do. Hackers who now work for Darpa are being used 
to design a new program that would decrease the 
drone’s dependency on the Internet, by creating an 
Internet without the anonymity part, is a popular 
suggestion (Ackerman, S. , 2011a). Also, considered 
creating a second secure network of the network to 
replace the current network and work in parallel with 
other networks (Ackerman, S. , 2011a), basically as 
complicated as it sounds will give the hacker a hard 
time hacking into the drones. However, most of 
Darpa’s focus is on securing the military network as 
a whole not the drones in particular which means that 
there are no guarantees. What seems to be specific 
project for the drones will be, still a concept, Crowd 
Sourced Formal Verification (CSFV) a means to 
control who is going in and out of the systems 
(Ackerman, 2011b). 
 
Even though, those measures may sound and seem 
powerful measures, but the reliance of Darpa to 
outsourced hackers is a risky task itself, especially 
when looking at Edward Snowden’s case what 
guarantees we have that there wouldn’t be a leak. 
Moreover it shows that the methods to counter these 
threats are the cheap and fast way only looking for 
short term and not long term, we don’t see a training 
program or a cyber education in countries except 
China. Which means that this threat is not taken as 
seriously as it should from the departments 
concerned but the measures taken is to contain the 
media effect and please the crowd.  
 
Other measures would be, decentralizing the drone 
system, meaning it doesn’t have to get the orders 
13
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from one single base but the drones become more 
autonomous yet with more direct control in the same 
time. Most of the hacking occurs to the fact that the 
drone gets the order from the base, if the base is 
penetrated or the drone gets order from what it’s 
convinced is the “base” then it gets easier to hack. 
However, if drones are more decentralized and 
independent like piloted aircraft in which each and 
every drone had its unique unencrypted GPS system 
and cyber security mechanism then it would be safer 
to have. It would cost more, but would risk less. 
Also, creating new software, like the Mac software 
that makes it immune from most viruses and cyber 
attacks, unlike Microsoft which may sound not an 
innovative idea but practical. 
 
To conclude, cyber warfare is a major threat not only 
to a state’s infrastructure, but also to its military 
capacity. Today cyber weapons are used as cheap 
asymmetric means to counter established armies such 
as the USA. That being said, the measures and 
attacks that have taken place against UAVs in the 
recent years haven’t rallied the attention that it 
deserves in order to pressure policy makers, and 
defense department heads to cyberly secure the 
UAVs, before terrorists, and rogue agents may use 
this vulnerability to their advantage. Unfortunately, it 
seems that the US and governments operating drone, 
need a sort of cyber pearl harbor against their drone 
fleet in order to appreciate the need for cyber 
security when it comes to UAV alike the other pillars 
of the state. Cyber war is by nature discreet, making 
us unaware with what is currently happening and 
only relying on what is exposed to us, maybe there 
are serious classified measures taking place for 
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future drone projects, but we wouldn’t know what 
we know though is that there is a vulnerability that is 
being exploited and if kept that way without proper 
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